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SCHOOL CHOICE AS A ONE-SIDED MATCHING PROBLEM:
CARDINAL UTILITIES AND OPTIMIZATION∗
S. AKSOY† , A. AZZAM‡ , C. COPPERSMITH§ , J. GLASS¶, G. KARAALIk , X. ZHAO∗∗,

arXiv:1304.7413v2 [math.OC] 30 Apr 2013

AND X. ZHU††

Abstract. The school choice problem concerns the design and implementation of matching
mechanisms that produce school assignments for students within a given public school district. Previously considered criteria for evaluating proposed mechanisms such as stability, strategyproofness
and Pareto efficiency do not always translate into desirable student assignments. In this note, we
explore a class of one-sided, cardinal utility maximizing matching mechanisms focused exclusively on
student preferences. We adapt a well-known combinatorial optimization technique (the Hungarian
algorithm) as the kernel of this class of matching mechanisms. We find that, while such mechanisms can be adapted to meet desirable criteria not met by any previously employed mechanism in
the school choice literature, they are not strategyproof. We discuss the practical implications and
limitations of our approach at the end of the article.
Key words. assignment, matching, school choice, Hungarian algorithm
AMS subject classifications. 90B80, 90C27, 91B14, 91B68

1. Introduction. School choice policies are processes by which families have
some say in determining where their children go to school. Since the late eighties such
policies have been adopted by many school districts across the nation. Before school
choice, students were typically assigned to public schools according to proximity. Since
wealthy families have the means to move to areas with desirable or reputable schools,
such families have always had de facto school choice. Children in families that could
not afford such a privilege were left with no other option than to attend the closest
school - whether or not the school was desirable and/or was a good fit. Thus school
choice has been celebrated as a successful tool giving more families the power to shape
their children’s education, regardless of socioeconomic background.
In many school districts where funding and experienced teachers are lacking,
school quality is uneven, and often a small number of schools are strongly preferred
over others. Since it is not possible to assign all students to their top choice school,
the question of how to assign students to schools is often regarded as the central
issue in school choice. In order to safeguard parents who seek to have their children
attend schools conveniently within walking distance, at which a sibling is enrolled, or
those offering need-based programs, districts define and adhere to a handful of school
priorities which encapsulate such constraints. Thus school choice can be viewed as
a two-sided matching problem. An extensive study of two-sided matching problems
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can be found in [30]; a more recent historical overview is [29].
Previous work on school choice as a matching problem evaluates assignments
using the notions of stability, Pareto efficiency and strategyproofness. Though all
worthy considerations, these do not necessarily suffice to promote the most desirable
outcomes. In the context of school choice, stability corresponds to preventing priority
violations. A priority violation occurs when a student desires a school more than the
school to which she was assigned, and has higher priority than a student assigned to
her desired school. Preventing priority violations is desirable for a very pragmatic
reason: Students whose priorities are violated may have legitimate grounds for legal
action. Even without legal recourse, it is often felt that students are “entitled” to
schools in which they have been prioritized. However the focus on avoiding priority
violations in current school choice mechanisms leads to documented inefficiencies. See
[2], [10], [20], [28] for more on this potential tradeoff between stability and efficiency.
In this note, we explore a class of one-sided mechanisms that aim to best honor
student preferences rather than focus on school priorities.1 In cities without welldefined or legally required priorities (e.g. those that use whole-city lotteries), such
an approach might be considered by policy makers in an attempt to make a studentoptimal matching. Even cities committed to respecting student priorities may find
these ideas valuable as priorities may indeed be incorporated at an intermediate or a
final stage, see the relevant discussion in §3.5. On a more theoretical level, we believe
that investigating the possible application of a well-known combinatorial optimization
algorithm to the school choice problem is of value in itself.
These mechanisms work under a given choice of cardinal utility transformation
- in other words, the mechanism designer cardinalizes ordinal preferences in a way
that respects the ordering. After students are matched to schools, their total cardinal utility assigns a numerical “cost” to each matching, and so we conceptualize the
school choice problem as a “cost-minimizing” assignment problem. We show how a
well-known optimization algorithm - the Hungarian algorithm - can be adapted to
find “cost-minimizing” assignments with respect to a given choice of cardinal utility
transformation. While there are infinitely many such cardinal utility transformations,
we illustrate the application of our mechanism by considering two: one which assumes
uniform utility gaps and another which weights ordinal preferences exponentially so
that the student receiving their least preferred school receives as preferred an assignment as possible. We show how both transformations reflect different economic
theories of fairness; however, we do not argue in favor of any particular cardinal utility
transformation over another, leaving such considerations to the reader.
We summarize some relevant recent work on school choice in §§1.1. In §§1.2 we introduce the notation and standard terminology used throughout the rest of the paper
and simultaneously describe our model. In §2 we define cardinal utility transformations (§§2.1) and introduce two evaluation criteria that correspond to distinct choices
of cardinal utility transformations (§§2.2, §§2.3). We introduce our mechanisms in §3,
first providing an elementary description of the standard algorithm (§§3.1) and then
explaining how we adapt it to the school choice problem (§§3.2). We study various
1 Two-sided matching problems where the preferences are one-sided have been considered in other
contexts as well. See for instance [16], a recent article on assigning papers to referees. In this regard
we are not treading totally uncharted territory, but such an approach has not yet been attempted
specifically for the SCP. In fact the most significant novelty in our approach is perhaps in devising
mechanisms to maximize the total utility for students, without systematically considering the priority
structures of the schools involved. Thus we propose, in this paper, ways to incorporate information
about cardinal preferences into practically useful assignment mechanisms (cf. §2).
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properties of our mechanisms (§§3.3, §§3.4) and discuss some implementation issues
(§§3.5). §4 concludes this note with a discussion of its implications and a view toward
future work.
1.1. Research background. School district policy decisions have long provided
active lines of inquiry for public policy designers, operations researchers, economists
and education administrators. Much of the relevant work has focused on designing
school district boundaries in order to optimize various measures. For a diverse yet
representative selection of work in this vein, see [7], [8], [11], [12].
In our work we focus on assignment policy as a mechanism design problem, which
provides a natural framework to investigate means of implementing social goals (cf.
[24]). In the current school choice literature, there has been much work surrounding
three specific mechanisms. The first two were introduced in [5] while the third was
presented in [20].
1. Student-Optimal Stable Matching Mechanism (SOSM)
2. Top Trading Cycles Mechanism (TTC)
3. Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (EADAM)
SOSM adapts the famous Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm [15]
to the school choice problem. It is well-established as a stable and strategyproof
mechanism that has already been implemented in several large urban school districts
[2], [4]. However, when applied to large-scale data SOSM may lead to some welfare
losses [20]. TTC is an alternative mechanism which promotes efficiency as opposed
to stability, and is also strategyproof. The basic algorithm is to create trading cycles
alternating between students and schools and to allow efficient matchings. EADAM
is proposed in [20] as a way to alleviate some of the efficiency costs of stability by
iteratively running SOSM and modifying the preferences of any interrupters (i.e.,
students who cause others to be rejected from a school which later on rejects them)
such that the SOSM outcome is Pareto dominated. As any Pareto domination of
SOSM will lead to priority violations (cf. [15]), EADAM leads to at least one priority
violation. We will not need the specific processes in our work.
Recent literature also examines various real-life mechanisms such as those from
Boston [3], Chicago [9], Milwaukee [17], [31], and New York City [1].
1.2. Notation, basic terms and our model. Let I denote a nonempty set
of students, and S a nonempty set of schools. For all s ∈ S, we let qs denote the
capacity of s and use the ordered tuple Q = (qs |s ∈ S) to encode all the capacities
in a given problem involving the set S of schools.
A preference profile for a student i ∈ I, written Pi , is a tuple (S1 , . . . , Sn )
where the Sj ’s form a partition of S and every element of Sj is preferred to every
element of Sk if and only if j < k. Define the ranking function ϕi : S → N of a
student i ∈ I by letting ϕi (s) denote i’s ranking of s ∈ S. In other words ϕi (s) = j
if s ∈ Sj . When each Sj is singleton, we say that i’s preference profile is strict, (in
which case we can view Pi as an n-vector). If sk , sl ∈ Sj for some j, k 6= l, then we
say that the student is indifferent between sk and sl . If i prefers sk to sl , we write
sk ≻i sl , or simply sk ≻ sl if i is unambiguous.
A priority structure for a school s ∈ S, written Πs , is a tuple (I1 , . . . , In ) where
the Ij ’s form a partition of I and every element of Ij is preferred to every element of
Ik if and only if j < k.
A school choice problem for a set S of schools and I of students is a triple
(P, Π, Q), where P = {Pi : i ∈ I} is a set of preference profiles for the students in I,
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Π = {Πs : s ∈ S} is a set of priority structures for the schools in S, and Q encodes
the capacities of schools in S.
Given a school choice problem (P, Π, Q) for a set S of schools and I of students, we
define a matching M : I → I × S to be a function that associates every student with
exactly one school, or potentially no school at all. We write Mi = s if M (i) = (i, s).
A matching M ′ (Pareto) dominates M if Mi′ ≻i Mi for all i and Mj′ ≻j Mj is
strict for some j. A (Pareto) efficient matching is a matching that is not (Pareto)
dominated.
If M = M(P, Π, Q) denotes the set of all matchings for the school choice problem
(P, Π, Q), then a matching mechanism M is defined to be a function:
M : (P, Π, Q) 7→ M(P, Π, Q)
that takes a school choice problem (P, Π, Q) and produces a matching M(P, Π, Q) ∈
M(P, Π, Q).
A mechanism is strategyproof if no student can ever receive a more preferred
school by submitting falsified, as opposed to truthful, preferences.
2. Cardinal utility transformations and evaluation criteria
for matching mechanisms. In this section, we use cardinal utility transformations
to translate ordinal student preferences into cardinal ones and determine a total cost
for any given assignment. Thus the school choice problem becomes a cost minimization
problem. At that point, a combinatorial optimization algorithm can be invoked to
find the optimal (lowest cost) matching (and we will do so in §3).
The question of what criteria to use to judge the quality or desirability of a mechanism is a difficult one; for example, see [25] where McFadden argues that tolerance
of behavioral faults should be included in such a list of criteria. The goal of school
districts when designing a school choice policy is not singular (unlike, for instance, the
case of auction design where our sole objective is to maximize selling price). Thus,
it is especially important to define feasible and meaningful yardsticks by which to
measure the success of a given school choice mechanism. One could define the best
school mechanism as one that minimizes the government education funding budgets,
produces the most elite students, or improves the conditions of less-advantaged students the most, etc. The current literature on school choice uses stability, (Pareto)
efficiency, and strategyproofness as the standard criteria for evaluating the desirability
of a given mechanism. In our work, we emphasize student preferences. Obviously, the
ultimate design depends on how we define the objectives of the school choice problem.
2.1. Cardinal utility transformations. Let I and S be a set of students and
schools, respectively, and let P be a set of preference profiles for the students in I.
Let ϕ(S) ⊂ N denote the set ∪i∈I ϕi (S). Then a cardinal utility transformation
for (I, S, P) is a strictly increasing function f : ϕ(S) → R. We can use any strictly
increasing function f : N → R but it suffices for f to be defined only on ∪i∈I ϕi (S).
It should be automatically clear that there exist infinitely many choices of f .
Some of these can indicate specific utility and fairness assumptions. For instance a
concave f can be used to model risk-averse preferences while a convex f can be used
to reflect risk-loving preferences. In our analysis, we use two specific choices of f to
illustrate the application of our mechanism.
We introduce a preference reverence index in §§2.2 and identify it as a type of
cost to be minimized. This corresponds to picking a specific example of the simplest,
linear, case of a cardinal utility transformation: Let f be a linear transformation
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of the form f (ϕ(S)) = a(ϕ(S)) + b where a, b ∈ R. Such a choice of f reflects the
assumption that students possess uniform utility gaps between schools. If we are
only given a list of ordinal preferences, one might invoke the principle of insufficient
reason to justify such an assumption. However, given the often sharp differences in
desirability between schools, this assumption may not be realistic.
One might alternatively try to choose f in the spirit of philosopher John Rawls’
Difference Principle. In the context of school choice, this might be interpreted as
maximizing the utility of the worst-off student – in other words, the student receiving
their least-preferred school receives as highly a preferred school as possible. Inspection
shows that a suitable choice of f is the exponential function f (ϕ(S)) = N (ϕ(S)) where
N is the total number of students. Under this choice of f , we see that assigning
all students their N − 1 ranked school yields the same disutility as assigning one
student their N ranked school, thus stipulating that any maximization of net utility
must necessarily give the student who received their least-preferred school as preferred
school as possible. We define a notion of rank minimality in §§2.3 with which we aim
to capture this principle.
Of course, there exist other choices of f that can be said to reflect other assumptions. Thus, in the class of mechanisms we consider, the mechanism designer chooses
an f to reflect the nature of the population as a whole, a preferred sense of fairness or
a desired interpretation of collective utility. It helps to recall that the only constraints
on f are that:
1. f respects the ordering of student preferences (i.e. f is strictly increasing on
ϕ(S)), and:
2. the mechanism designer chooses a unique f to be applied uniformly over all
student preferences.
In order to make sure the algorithm we want to use works properly, we will also
require that
(3) the range of f fall within the nonnegative numbers.
2.2. A preference reverence index. Let I be a nonempty set of students,
and S be a nonempty set of m schools. Recall that for any i ∈ I, s ∈ S, ϕi (s) is i’s
ranking of s and for any matching M : I → I × S, Mi = s denotes that M (i) = (i, s).
Let M be the set of matchings. Define µ : M → N by
X
µ(M ) =
(ϕi (Mi ) − 1) .
i∈I

For any given M ∈ M we will call µ(M ) the preference reverence index of M or
simply the preference index.
Since M is finite, µ(M) is finite and hence there exists some M ∈ M such that
µ(M ) ≤ µ(M ′ ) for all M ′ ∈ M. We will describe a method of seeking and locating
such a minimal index matching in §3. In [19] we discussed several properties of this
index; readers interested in other efficiency metrics might also like to see [6]. Here
we will only point out that using the index as the cost to be minimized in a school
choice problem corresponds to using the function f1 (n) = n − 1 as the cardinality
transformation function.
The preference index measures how well ordinal preferences are being honored as
a whole. Each time we move to the next-best choice in a student’s ranking, this counts
as “1 violation” of their preferences, and we then add up the number of times we make
such violations. Thus, perhaps a more apt title would be “preference dismissal index”
since it is a measure of how little the preferences are being “honored” or “revered.”
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It should be noted that the preference index assumes that it is the same to give one
student their fifth choice and one their first choice (Total=4) as it is to give two
students their third choice (Total=4).
2.3. Rank minimality. Let S = (P, Π, Q) be a given school choice problem
for a set S of schools and a set I of students. We define the rank of a matching
M : I → I × S, M ∈ M(P, Π, Q), to be the maximal rank assigned to individual
students under that matching:
rank M = max{ϕi (Mi )|i ∈ I}.
We say that a matching M : I → I × S, M ∈ M(P, Π, Q), is rank-minimal if it
has minimal rank, or in other words if it minimizes the maximal individual assigned
ranks in the following sense:
max{ϕi (Mi )|i ∈ I} ≤ max{ϕi (Mi′ )|i ∈ I}

for all M ′ ∈ M(P, Π, Q).

In words, this means that the worst off student under M is better off than the worst
off student under any other M ′ .
Given the above definition, we will call a matching mechanism M rank-minimal
if for any set S of schools and a set I of students given, M maps any school choice
problem S = (P, Π, Q) for S and I to a rank-minimal matching.
Before moving forward, we compare our definitions here with a related notion,
that of rank maximality (cf. [18, Def.1.2]): A matching is rank maximal if the
maximum possible number of applicants are matched to their first choice, and subject
to that condition, the maximum possible number of applicants are matched to their
second choice, and so on.
Though this may sound similar to our notion of rank minimality, in many cases
we will see there are some subtle differences. For instance consider the following
preference profile for a school choice problem with five students and five schools, each
with capacity 1:
i1
i2
i3
i4
i5

: s1
: s2
: s3
: s4
: s1

≻ s2
≻ s3
≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s2

≻ s3
≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s1
≻ s5

≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s1
≻ s2
≻ s3

≻ s5
≻ s1
≻ s2
≻ s3
≻ s4

There are two matchings which assign the most number of students (four) to their
top choice:




i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
and
s5 s2 s3 s4 s1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
It is easy to see that the only rank maximal matching is the first one, which has rank
3 (the second has rank 5). However if we want a rank minimal matching, we can find
one with rank 2:


i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
s2 s3 s4 s5 s1
In §§3 we see that we can use an exponential cardinal utility transformation to
ensure that an optimization algorithm can yield a rank-minimal matching for a given
school choice problem.
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3. Cost-minimizing Mechanisms for the School Choice Problem. In §2
we introduced the notion of cardinal utility transformations and suggested two natural
evaluation criteria for the school choice problem that correspond to two specific types
of cardinal utility transformations. In this section we describe a flexible assignment
mechanism which can be geared specifically toward these notions (or others, depending
on the choice of cardinal utility transformation).
The mechanism described here is built upon a combinatorial optimization algorithm known as the Hungarian algorithm. The Hungarian algorithm is traditionally
used to find the minimum cost matching in various min-cost max-flow problems
such as assigning individuals to tasks or determining minimum cost networks in travel
[21], [22]. We note that the algorithm can be processed in polynomial time [26], hence
the mechanism itself can be effectively implemented via a computer program.
As the purpose of the Hungarian algorithm is to find the minimum cost matching,
the first step in adapting the algorithm to the school choice problem is to define the
cost of any particular matching. Here is where the cardinal utility transformation
comes in. For a matching M : I → I × S, M ∈ M(P, Π, Q), and a cardinal utility
transformation f , we will define the cost of M to be:
X
Cf (M ) =
f (ϕi (Mi )).
i∈I

Note here that choosing the cardinal utility transformation f1 (n) = n − 1 ensures
that the cost Cf1 (M ) of a matching M is precisely the preference reverence index of
M (cf. §§2.2). This measures the cost in terms of the number and extent of preference
violations. Alternatively if we use the exponential cardinal utility transformation
f2 (ϕ(S)) = N (ϕ(S)) where N is the total number of students, then we will see that
minimizing the resultant cost will ensure that the outcome matching will be rankminimal.
In the rest of this section we focus on various aspects of using the Hungarian
algorithm in the school choice problem. We first describe the standard Hungarian
algorithm for assignment problems with cost determined by a given cardinal utility
transformation f (§§3.1). We then explain how we adapt it further to work for the
school choice problem (§§3.2). Next we study efficiency properties of this “Hungarian”
school choice mechanism (§§3.3) and how one can strategize under this mechanism
(§§3.4). We discuss some implementation issues in §§3.5.
3.1. Description. In the following we present an elementary description of the
Hungarian algorithm within the context of school choice. Our presentation is equivalent to the original development in [21]. For a more sophisticated discussion including
computational complexity concerns and an exhaustive investigation of the many variants of the method that lead to impressive complexity improvements, see [32, Ch.17].
Let I and S be a set of students and schools, respectively, and assume that a
student preference profile P is given. Also assume that we have selected a cardinal
utility transformation f and thus defined the associated cost function Cf . Since the
space M of all matchings is finite, Cf (M) = {Cf (M ) : M ∈ M} is finite and therefore
there exists some M ∈ M such that Cf (M ) ≤ Cf (M ′ ) for all M ′ ∈ M. We would like
to find such a minimal cost matching.
Let A = (ajk ) be the n × m matrix such that ajk = ϕij (sk ), encoding student
preferences. Use the cardinal utility transformation f on each of the entries to obtain
a cost matrix Cf ; we would like this to have no negative entries, so it is useful to
insist that the range of f fall within the nonnegative numbers. For now assume that
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n = m, i.e., there is an equal number of students and schools and each school has a
capacity of one.
For example for the following preference profile of three students for three schools:
i 1 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
i 2 : s3 ≻ s2 ≻ s1
i 3 : s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s1
the matrix A of preferences would be:
i1
i2
i3

s1
1
3
3

s2
2
2
1

and the associated cost matrix using f1 would

0 1
Cf =  2 1
2 0

s3
3
1
2
be:

2
0 .
1

Now the assignment problem reduces to: Given a cost matrix Cf , pick one entry from
each row and each column such that the sum of the selected entries is minimal. The
Hungarian algorithm can then be used to find a solution to this reformulated problem.
In this specific case the algorithm will run as follows (cf. [27, Figure 6.1]):
1. Subtract the smallest entry in each row from each entry in that row. [After
this stage, all rows have at least one zero entry, and all matrix entries are
nonnegative.]
2. Subtract the smallest entry in each column from each entry in that column.
[After this stage, all rows and columns have at least one zero entry, and matrix
entries are still nonnegative.]
3. Draw lines through appropriate rows and columns so that all the zero entries
of the cost matrix are covered and the minimum number of such lines is used.
[There may be several ways to do this, but the main point is that it can be
done.]
4. Test for optimality: If the number of covering lines is n, then an optimal
assignment of all zeroes is possible and we are done; the algorithm terminates.
Otherwise, such an assignment is not yet possible, and we proceed to Step 5.
5. Determine the smallest entry not covered by any line, subtract it from all
uncovered entries and add it to all entries covered by both a horizontal and
a vertical line. Return to Step 3.
When the algorithm terminates at some reiteration of Step 4, we use the position of the zeros in the terminal matrix to determine the desired assignment which
corresponds to the least cost matching [26]. Here, for instance, is the outcome of the
Hungarian algorithm for the preference profile above:
i1
i2
i3

s1
1
3
3

s2
2
2
1

s3
3
1
2

We note that Step 5 crucially depends on the following
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Theorem 3.1 (Theorem 6.1 [27]). If a number is added to or subtracted from
all of the entries of any row or column of a cost matrix, then an optimal (minimum
cost) assignment for the resulting cost matrix is also an optimal assignment for the
original cost matrix.
3.2. A “Hungarian” school choice mechanism. In adapting the Hungarian
algorithm to the most general version of the school choice problem, we must make
three key modifications, in order to accommodate 1) differing school capacities, 2)
differing numbers of students, and 3) incomplete preference profiles. We consider
these individually below.
The construction of the algorithm as we presented it above requires as input an n×
n matrix of non-negative numbers, and it selects as output a unique entry in each row
and each column. We must modify the algorithm to accommodate school capacities,
unequal numbers of seats and students, as well as preferences containing different
numbers of ranked schools.2 In the following we will call our modified mechanism the
Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism and denote it by HMf , where f is the chosen
cardinal utility transformation.
Assume columns represent schools and rows represent students in our matrix.
To express school capacities, we simply add an extra column for each available seat
at a school and enter the same preferences for that column.3 Thus, each column
would represent a seat at a school, rather than an entire school. Then, if there are
an unequal number of available seats and students (i.e. an unequal number of rows
and columns), we add dummy rows or dummy columns, which represent nonexistent
students or schools. Thus, if a “dummy row student” were assigned to an actual
school, this would signify an open seat at that school, whereas if an actual student
were assigned a “dummy column school” this would signify that that student remains
unassigned by the mechanism.
The third modification addresses the problem of families submitting incomplete
preference profiles. Some school districts might not require that all preference profiles
include the same number of schools, and it is likely that preference profiles would not
be required to include all possible school assignments. Regardless, in order to run the
Hungarian algorithm, it is necessary to devise a way of completing student preferences
such that each student preference list assigns a rank to each school or seat.
A potential solution is to use dummy variables to complete any missing entries
in the matrix. However, this method may invite students to strategize. Even without
complete information, students might be motivated to strategize by only submitting
their first choice school, thereby weighting this choice with dummy variables so that
the algorithm is more likely to select it.
Alternatively we can fill out the remainder of a student preference profile with
an equal ranking for all unranked schools. More specifically if a student’s preference
profile contains only r ranks, then we assign the rank r + 1 to all the remaining
schools. This incentivizes the completion of preference lists, since otherwise all remaining schools will be treated equally. For instance, if a family puts only their first
2 There are various reasons why students may choose to list different numbers of schools. For
instance they may decide to pursue other options, such as private schooling, unless they happen to
get into their top choice.
3 Thus the matrix could have some repeated entries. In fact students could even submit nonstrict rankings. In this manner the Hungarian Mechanisms introduced in this paper allow students
to display indifferences between various schools with no penalty. We will say a bit more on this in
Section 4.
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choice, all other choices will be considered “second”; therefore they may get a school
which they consider terrible at low cost as measured by the mechanism. Thus it would
behoove them to fill out as many schools as possible if they had a genuine preference
for one over another.
Now, let us focus on what happens for specific choices of cardinal utility transformations. Since our cost in the example from §§3.1 was precisely the preference
reverence index itself, we can see that the resultant matching there has the smallest
preference index with respect to each student’s preferences.4
Similarly if we use f2 as the cardinal utility transformation, we will obtain a rankminimal outcome. Recall that in this case the cost of the assignment will be given
by
X
X
Cf2 =
f2 (ϕi (HMf2 (i))) =
N ϕi (HMf2 (i)) ,
i∈I

i∈I

where N is the number of students. Now we assume, to reach a contradiction, that
HMf2 is not rank minimal and assigns some student i to her j th ranked school when
there is indeed a way to assign all students to schools which they all want more than
they want their jth choice. This implies that the cost term corresponding to the
student i will be N j for HMf2 , while for a rank-minimal matching, each student
contributes a term to the cost a number that is less than that. In fact if there is
a rank-minimal way to assign students to schools, say via the matching M ′ , the
corresponding f2 -cost will be less than N j as a whole:
X
′
Nj ≥
N ϕi (M (s) .
i∈I

Thus, if the Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism were to assign one student her j th
ranked school when it was possible to assign all students to more preferred (ranked
less than j) schools, this would contradict the fact that the Hungarian algorithm
matching minimizes the cost given by the sum of the selected entries of the matrix.
Therefore, the outcome of HMf2 has to be rank-minimal.
3.3. Pareto efficiency and the Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism.
The Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism is efficient:
Theorem 3.2. If the Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism outputs matching M
under some monotonically increasing cardinal utility transformation function f , then
M is Pareto efficient.
Proof. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that M is Pareto dominated by
another matching M ′ . This necessarily means that two or more students prefer their
matchings in M ′ over M , while the matches for the rest of the students remain
unchanged. Since f is strictly monotonically increasing, M ′ must necessarily have
a lower total “cost” than M . But this contradicts our original hypothesis that the
Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism outputs M .
However, the converse is not necessarily true:
Theorem 3.3. If M is Pareto efficient, then there does not necessarily exist
4 Note that our use of the definite article for “the smallest preference index” is in fact not justified.
The output of the Hungarian algorithm is not necessarily unique; there are cases with multiple minima
to the cost function to be optimized. This is not an unresolvable issue however, and we address it in
detail in §§3.5. Till then we will assume that in case of multiple minima, our mechanism will choose
randomly between them.
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some monotonically increasing cardinal utility transformation function f under which
the Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism yields M as a solution.
Proof. We prove with a counterexample. Consider the preference profile:
i 1 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
i 2 : s3 ≻ s1 ≻ s2
i 3 : s3 ≻ s2 ≻ s1
Now, consider two Pareto efficient matchings associated with this preference profile:
Matching 1


i1 i2 i3
.
s1 s2 s3
Matching 2:


i1 i2 i3
.
s1 s3 s2
Matching 1 has total “cost” of f (1) + f (3) + f (1) while Matching 2 has total cost
of f (1) + f (1) + f (2). Since f is strictly monotonically increasing, f (2) < f (3), thus
the total cost of Matching 1 is strictly greater than that of Matching 2. Thus, under
no f will the Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism ever choose Matching 1.
The two theorems above tell us that any choice of f will yield Pareto efficient
matchings under the Hungarian algorithm; however, not all Pareto efficient matchings
can be found by the Hungarian algorithm under a suitable choice of f . Thus, the
set of all matchings output by the Hungarian algorithm under all f defines a proper
subset of the set of Pareto efficient matchings.
3.4. The Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism and Strategic Action.
Next we carefully examine the performance of HMf with respect to strategic action.
We first begin by describing how one can strategize under the given mechanism.
Given a choice of f , a student’s preference profile over n schools can be viewed
simply as a permutation of n numbers as represented in the cost matrix for the
Hungarian algorithm. The set of all such n! permutations constitutes the set of all
possible preferences (and therefore available actions) to each student. Thus, under
complete information, a general (albeit extremely inefficient) heuristic for determining
when and how to strategize would be to run the Hungarian algorithm under each of
these n! permutations. If, under any of these “falsified” preference permutations, a
student receives a preferred school (or, if there are multiple solutions, a better expected
outcome), then they should strategize by changing their true preference permutation
to that falsified preference permutation.
Given that it is unlikely that students would possess complete information on
the preferences of all of their classmates, and furthermore that assignment outcomes
may be sensitive to minor changes in a classmate’s preferences, what is perhaps more
meaningful in applied contexts is whether there exists a simple strategy that students
can apply under incomplete information.
In answering this question, we begin with a brief example to illustrate that seemingly “counterintuitive” strategies can actually be quite effective under the Hungarian
algorithm. Recall the strategy for which the Boston Mechanism has most often been
criticized (see for instance [3]): rather than “squander” your first choice on a popular
school that you would be unlikely to receive, rank some of the popular schools as
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less preferred while ranking the slightly less popular (and therefore more achievable)
schools more highly. If a student believes she has little chance of receiving a popular
school, such a strategy might be adopted in hopes of securing a spot in a less popular
school. It turns out that this is not a viable strategy in the Hungarian setting, but a
totally opposite and a somewhat counterintuitive method will work.
Consider the realistic scenario in which there are sharp discrepancies between
schools in terms of desirability. In this case, a student with a notion of the relative
popularity of each school among the general public might approximate the preferences
of his classmates as more or less homogenous. In the example we construct, student i1
believes that s1 and s2 are the two most popular schools, while s3 and s4 are the two
least popular. Thus, i1 believes that his classmates will, in general, have preferences:
i : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s4 . Student i1 ’s own truthful preferences differ slightly from those
of the general public: i1 : s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s4 ≻ s1 . When viewed in a matrix, we have:
i1
i2
i3
..
.
in

s1
f (4)
f (1)
f (1)
..
.
f (1)

s2
f (1)
f (2)
f (2)
..
.
f (2)

s3
f (2)
f (3)
f (3)
..
.
f (3)

s4
f (3)
f (4)
f (4)
..
.
f (4)

Here, for any choice of f , there are multiple solutions to the Hungarian algorithm. Inspection shows that under no cost-minimizing solution will i1 receive s1 and (assuming
a solution is chosen randomly), he has equal probability of receiving s2 , s3 , or s4 (because the algorithm eventually maps to zero all matrix entries on the first row except
(3)
.
the first one). Thus, given a choice of f , i1 has expected outcome: f (1)+f (2)+f
3
Now, assume i1 attempts to strategize by submitting falsified preferences represented in the matrix:
i1
i2
i3
..
.
in

s1
f (2)
f (1)
f (1)
..
.
f (1)

s2
f (1)
f (2)
f (2)
..
.
f (2)

s3
f (3)
f (3)
f (3)
..
.
f (3)

s4
f (4)
f (4)
f (4)
..
.
f (4)

Under these falsified preferences, inspection shows that in any cost-minimizing solution i1 receives s2 . Since i1 is now receiving his first choice with certainty, and
recalling that his true cardinal utility for s2 is given by f (1), we see that his expected
outcome is now f (1). Compare this to i1 ’s expected outcome under truthful prefer(3)
ences: f (1) ≤ f (1)+f (2)+f
. Since lower expected outcomes correspond to higher
3
expected utility, we see i1 is better off under these falsified preferences. As i1 receives his first choice school with certainty here, no other set of falsified preferences
can achieve a strictly better outcome for i1 , so i1 ’s optimal strategy is to submit the
falsified preferences above.
Note that i1 improves his expected outcome by putting the most popular school
s1 higher on his list, up from his fourth choice to his second, while also ranking the
two least popular schools, s3 and s4 , lower on his list, pushing them back from his
second and third choice to his third and fourth. Clearly, strategizing in the context
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of the Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism is different and perhaps more subtle than
in the Boston Mechanism.
To develop a more explicit, nuanced, and reliable strategy, we again consider the
scenario in which there are sharp discrepancies between the desirabilities of certain
schools. We assume that, with some sense of the relative popularity of schools in
mind, student i1 ascribes homogenous preferences to his classmates. We begin with
the following:
Lemma 3.4. If students i1 , i2 , · · · , iN have homogenous preferences over N schools,
that is, for all s ∈ S, ϕik (s) = ϕij (s) for 1 ≤ j 6= k ≤ N , then the Utility-BasedHungarian Mechanism HMf for the cardinal utility transformation f finds N ! costminimizing
solutions, each having a total “cost” or sum of assigned cardinal utility
PN
values of k=1 f (ϕik (sk )).
Proof. We can represent the situation as follows:
i1
i2
..
.
iN

s1
f (ϕi1 (s1 ))
f (ϕi2 (s1 ))
..
.
f (ϕiN (s1 ))

s2
f (ϕi1 (s2 ))
f (ϕi2 (s2 ))
..
.
f (ϕiN (s2 ))

...
...
...
..
.
...

sN
f (ϕi1 (sN ))
f (ϕi2 (sN ))
..
.
f (ϕiN (sN ))

However, for all s ∈ S we have ϕik (s) = ϕij (s) for 1 ≤ j 6= k ≤ N , so we can
rewrite:
i1
i2
..
.
iN

s1
s2
f (ϕi1 (s1 )) f (ϕi1 (s2 ))
f (ϕi1 (s1 )) f (ϕi1 (s2 ))
..
..
.
.
f (ϕi1 (s1 )) f (ϕi1 (s2 ))

...
...
...
..
.
...

sN
f (ϕi1 (sN ))
f (ϕi1 (sN ))
..
.
f (ϕi1 (sN ))

Since the Hungarian algorithm requires each row and column to have a unique
assignment, each possible cost-minimizing matching can be thought of as some permutation of the N real numbers in the set {f (ϕi1 (s1 )), f (ϕi1 (s2 )), . . . , f (ϕi1 (sN ))}.
There are N ! such permutations, so there are N ! such cost-minimizing matchings.
Furthermore, the sum of assigned cardinal utility values
PNis simply the sum of each
number in this permutation, and is therefore given by k=1 f (ϕik (sk )).
A natural next step is:
Lemma 3.5. If student i1 has preferences given by his ranking function ϕi1
over N schools and his N − 1 classmates have homogenous preferences given by the
ranking function ϕ−i1 , then for each possible assignment of school sk to i1 , there
exist
matchings, each with equal total “cost” of f (ϕi1 (sk )) +
 P (N − 1)! associated

N
j=1 f (ϕ−i1 (sj )) − f (ϕ−i1 (sk )).
Proof. We can represent the situation as follows:

i1
i2
..
.
iN

s1
f (ϕi1 (s1 ))
f (ϕ−i1 (s1 ))
..
.
f (ϕ−i1 (s1 ))

s2
f (ϕi1 (s2 ))
f (ϕ−i1 (s2 ))
..
.
f (ϕ−i1 (s2 ))

...
...
...
..
.
...

sN
f (ϕi1 (sN ))
f (ϕ−i1 (sN ))
..
.
f (ϕ−i1 (sN ))
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Assume student i1 is assigned to school sk . Then, since the Hungarian algorithm finds
a unique assignment per row and per column, the rest of the students are matched in
a (N − 1) × (N − 1) matrix. Therefore by Lemma 3.4, there are (N − 1)! associated
matchings for each assignment possibility of sk to i1 . Furthermore, each of these
matchings must have equal f -cost, since (again by Lemma 3.4) the sum of the assigned
PN
cardinal utility values of these (N − 1)! classmates is j=1 f (ϕ−i1 (sj )) − f (ϕ−i1 (sk )).
Together with i1 ’s cardinal utility value of f (ϕi1 (sk )), the total “cost” of this matching
is thus given by:
f (ϕi1 (sk )) +

N
X
j=1


f (ϕ−i1 (sj )) − f (ϕ−i1 (sk )),

which completes the proof.
Now the next result follows immediately:
Theorem 3.6. If student i1 has preferences given by his ranking function ϕi1
over N schools and his N − 1 classmates have homogenous preferences given by the
ranking function ϕ−i1 , then under the Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism HMf , i1
will only receive school(s) sk where
f (ϕi1 (sk )) − f (ϕ−i1 (sk )) ≤ f (ϕi1 (sl )) − f (ϕ−i1 (sl )) for all l 6= k.
Proof. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that HMf assigned i1 to some
school sk while there existed some school sl such that
f (ϕi1 (sk )) − f (ϕ−i1 (sk )) > f (ϕi1 (sl )) − f (ϕ−i1 (sl )).

N
Adding
(s
))
to both sides, we get (by Lemma 3.5) that the total cost
f
(ϕ
−i1 j
j=1
of a matching in which i1 receives sk is strictly more than one in which i1 receives
sl . This contradicts the fact that the Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism is costminimizing.
To illustrate how a strategizing student might apply Theorem 3.6 effectively to
strategize, let us revisit the example with which we began our examination of strategic
action, setting f to be the identity function f (ϕ(S)) = ϕ(S):
P

i1
i2
i3
..
.
in

s1
4
1
1
..
.
1

s2
1
2
2
..
.
2

s3
2
3
3
..
.
3

s4
3
4
4
..
.
4

Applying Theorem 3.6, i1 would first compute:
f (ϕi1 (s1 )) − f (ϕ−i1 (s1 )) = (4 − 1) = +3,
f (ϕi1 (s2 )) − f (ϕ−i1 (s2 )) = (1 − 2) = −1,
f (ϕi1 (s3 )) − f (ϕ−i1 (s3 )) = (2 − 3) = −1,
f (ϕi1 (s4 )) − f (ϕ−i1 (s4 )) = (3 − 4) = −1,
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and see that under no cost-minimizing matching can he receive s1 , and that he is
equally likely to receive s2 , s3 , and s4 . In order to ensure receiving his first choice
s2 , student i1 must submit falsified preferences such that f (ϕi1 (s2 )) − f (ϕ−i1 (s2 )) ≤
f (ϕi1 (s)) − f (ϕ−i1 (s)) for all s ∈ S. Indeed falsifying his preferences as i1 : s2 ≻ s1 ≻
s3 ≻ s4 works. Under these falsified preferences, we have
f (ϕi1 (s1 )) − f (ϕ−i1 (s1 )) = (2 − 1) = +1,
f (ϕi1 (s2 )) − f (ϕ−i1 (s2 )) = (1 − 2) = −1,
f (ϕi1 (s3 )) − f (ϕ−i1 (s3 )) = (3 − 3) = 0,
f (ϕi1 (s3 )) − f (ϕ−i1 (s3 )) = (4 − 4) = 0.
Thus we conclude that the Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism is not immune to
strategic action, even under incomplete information. In realistic scenarios, preferences
will never be completely homogenous as we assumed. One can argue that the above
strategy will become less reliable the more “heterogenous” preferences become; the
authors have not explored this direction.
3.5. An implementation issue: multiple minima. In some instances the
cost function we define might not correspond to a strict ordering. For instance with
the cardinal utility transformation f1 , the cost function we obtain (the preference
reverence index) may induce a non-strict ordering of the possible matchings, and a
given preference profile might have multiple minimum preference index solutions. For
example, consider the following preference profile:
i1
i2
i3
i4

: s1
: s4
: s3
: s3

≻ s2
≻ s2
≻ s1
≻ s4

≻ s3
≻ s1
≻ s4
≻ s2

≻ s4
≻ s3
≻ s2
≻ s1

Here, there are three minimum cost (minimum preference index) matchings:


i1 i2 i3 i4
Matching #1 (Cf1 = 2) :
s1 s2 s3 s4

Matching #2

(Cf1 = 2) :



Matching #3

(Cf1 = 2) :



i1
s2
i1
s1

i2
s4

i3
s1

i4
s3



i2
s4

i3
s3

i4
s2



The Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism HMf1 as defined above will output Matching 1. Is this a desirable situation?
The underlying theoretical problem of finding all possible minimum cost assignments by the Hungarian algorithm was addressed in [14] (see [13] for an improvement
on the main (polynomial time) algorithm used in [14] and [23] for more recent work
in a similar vein). Thus it is possible to find all minimum cost (minimum preference index) solutions using a mechanism adopting the Hungarian algorithm. This in
turn raises the natural question: How does one choose among multiple minima? We
propose two possible approaches to deal with this issue.
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1. If one intends to promote fairness by narrowing the discrepancies between
the rankings of student assignments, then the matching with the minimum
variance across individual student preference indices should be chosen.
2. If one intends to manage priorities and choose “the most stable” matching,
then the matching with the fewest number of students whose priority has
been violated should be chosen.5
Of course, one may use both of these in succession.
This incidentally addresses a possible concern about the Hungarian algorithm: its
dependence on the order of the rows and the columns of the input matrix. Especially
when there are multiple minimal index solutions, the order in which students or
schools are listed may indeed affect the outcome, and the output matching may be
different in different cases (though any two outcomes in such a scenario will have the
same minimal cost). However if we modify our mechanism to look instead for all
possible minimum cost matchings, this no longer creates a problem. Thus, the order
of the rows or columns ultimately does not matter because: (1) If there is a unique
cost-minimizing solution, the order does not affect the outcome; and (2) if there are
multiple cost-minimizing solutions, we can find all of them using our mechanism, with
adaptations a la [14].
The situation is somewhat different in the case of HMf2 where the outcome
matching is rank-minimal. More specifically, if we were to use [13] to find all minimum
cost matchings with respect to the cardinal utility transformation f2 , we would not
necessarily find all rank-minimal matchings. This is because there might exist two
rank-minimal matchings for a given preference profile that have different costs. For
example, consider the following preference profile:
i 1 : s3 ≻ s2 ≻ s1
i 2 : s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s1
i 3 : s2 ≻ s1 ≻ s3
There are two matchings which both have the minimum rank-2 but have different
costs:


i
i2 i3
Matching 1 (Rank-2, Cf2 = 15) : 1
s3 s2 s1

Matching 2 (Rank-2, Cf2 = 27) :



i1
s2

i2
s3

i3
s1



Here, Matching 1 is the minimum f2 -cost matching that will be found by the UtilityBased Hungarian Mechanism when we use f2 as the cardinal utility transformation,
while Matching 2 is another matching with the same minimal rank. Notice that
Matching 1 Pareto dominates Matching 2, so we can see that at least with regard
to one other criterion, Matching 1 is measurably better.6 One can nonetheless see a
heuristic method to find all rank-minimal matchings: List all possible matchings in
5 This is not the same as looking at the total number of priority violations since a student could
have his priority violated by multiple students. Once a student’s priority has been violated, he can
pursue legal action whether his priority is violated by one or by one hundred students. Thus, policy
makers will probably be more concerned with how many students had their priorities violated rather
than how many total priority violations there are.
6 In fact, all minimum f -cost matchings are not only rank-minimal, but are also Pareto efficient
2
(cf. Theorem 3.2), though not all rank-minimal matchings will be Pareto efficient.
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order of increasing f2 -cost. Every matching listed above the first one that changes
rank will be rank-minimal.
In case of multiple minima for f2 -cost, we can again use [13] to find all minimum
f2 -cost matchings, and employ analogues of the two aforementioned tie-breaking criteria to determine which matching to pick. We can also use cost functions like Cf1 as
additional criteria.7
4. Conclusion. Current school choice mechanisms focus on balancing student
preferences and school priorities, and the resulting matches sacrifice desirable characteristics. Since a good public education is a scarce resource, there is no way to
assign students to schools in such a way that all students attend top schools. In our
approach we chose to focus exclusively on student preferences.8 As a result school
choice became a one-sided matching problem. We next used the notion of a cardinal
utility transformation to convert student preferences into cardinal utility ranks and
thus translated the school choice problem into a cost minimization problem, where
the cost depends on the choice of cardinal utility transformation f . Two particular
instances of f corresponded neatly to two natural criteria frequently used in combinatorial optimization problems.
The mechanism presented here was adapted from the Hungarian algorithm [21]
which was developed as a combinatorial solution to the assignment problem. Our
modifications included a re-interpretation of assignments taking into account school
capacities and required that we be allowed to “complete” submitted student preference profiles. With the introduction of this flexibility came the requirement that we
determine a fair way of completing student preference profiles. In the profile completion process we sought to avoid confounding the problem of having non-participatory
parents/adults costing unknowing and often powerless children a seat at the best
possible school.
An obvious weakness of our proposed mechanism is instability. Since we ignored
priorities as a whole, it was natural that the outcomes would suffer in terms of stability.
We see a robust incorporation of school priories as an interesting direction for further
investigation.
Another interesting direction for future work is in the incorporation of indifferences. In particular, the Utility-Based Hungarian Mechanism affords students the opportunity to express indifferences. If a student is indifferent between several schools,
the ranking number for these schools is simply repeated in the matrix. It seems on
a cursory inspection that a dishonest representation of indifferences can only serve to
harm a student’s chance of receiving his preferred schools. There has been much work
focusing on indifferences in school priorities (see for instance [10]), but not as much
has been done on student indifferences. We believe that this is an interesting thread
to follow.
Acknowledgments. This paper evolved from work the authors presented in a
special paper session on computational social choice at a conference (ISAIM 2012
(International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics (ISAIM 2012),
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, USA, January 9-11, 2012). A brief paper [19] was published
as part of the proceedings of that conference. The current paper refers to some results
7 In

the example given, Cf1 = 1 for Matching 1 and Cf1 = 3 for Matching 2.
focus on student preferences over school priorities is natural in the current climate in which
the public debate over charter schools and school vouchers rages in an attempt to offer parents more
control over their children’s educational choices. See for instance several recent feature-length movies
on school choice: Waiting for “Superman”, The Lottery, The Cartel Movie.
8 Our
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in those proceedings, but is substantially revised and independent. Thus we hereby
submit it for publication; the different title indicates the substantially different focus
of the current paper.
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[2] Atila Abdulkadiroǧlu, Parag A Pathak, and Alvin E Roth, Strategy-proofness versus
efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the nyc high school match, American
Economic Review, 99 (2009), pp. 1954–1978.
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[5] A. Abdulkadiroǧlu and T. Sönmez, School choice: A mechanism design approach, The
American Economic Review, 93 (2003), pp. 729–747.
[6] James W. Boudreau and Vicki Knoblauch, The price of stability in matching markets,
Working papers 2010-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, (2010).
[7] Arlene K Brown and Karen W Knight, School boundary and student assignment procedures
in large, urban, public school systems, Education and Urban Society, 37 (2005), pp. 398–
418.
[8] F. Caro, T. Shirabe, M. Guignard, and A. Weintraub, School redistricting: Embedding
gis tools with integer programming, The Journal of the Operational Research Society, 55
(2004), pp. 836–849.
[9] Julie Berry Cullen, Brian A Jacob, and Steven Levitt, The effect of school choice on
participants: Evidence from randomized lotteries, Econometrica, 74 (2006), pp. 1191–1230.
[10] Aytek Erdil and Haluk I. Ergin, What’s the matter with tie-breaking? improving efficiency
in school choice, American Economic Review, 98 (2008), pp. 669–689.
[11] Jacques Ferland and Gilles Guenett, Decision support system for the school districting
problem, Operations Research, 38 (1990), pp. 15–20.
[12] AD Franklin and E Koenigsber, Computed school assignments in a large district, Operations
Research, 21 (1973), pp. 413–426.
[13] K Fukuda, Finding all the perfect matchings in bipartite graphs, Applied Mathematics Letters,
7 (1994), pp. 15–18.
[14] Komei Fukuda and Tomomi Matsui, Finding all minimum-cost perfect matchings in bipartite
graphs, Networks, 22 (1992), pp. 461–468.
[15] D Gale and L S Shapley, College admissions and the stability of marriage, The American
Mathematical Monthly, 69 (1962), pp. 9–15.
[16] Naveen Garg, Telikepalli Kavitha, Amit Kumar, Kurt Mehlhorn, and Julian Mestre,
Assigning papers to referees, Algorithmica, 58 (2010), pp. 119–136.
[17] Jay P Greene, Paul E Peterson, and Jiangtao Du, Effectiveness of school choice: The
milwaukee experiment, Education and Urban Society, 31 (1999), pp. 190–213.
[18] Robert W. Irving, Telikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn, Dimitrios Michail, and
Katarzyna E. Paluch, Rank-maximal matchings, ACM Trans. Algorithms, 2 (2006),
pp. 602–610.
[19] Gizem Karaali, Sinan Aksoy, Adam Azzam, Chaya Coppersmith, Julie Glass, Xueying
Zhao, and Xinjing Zhu, A cost-minimizing algorithm for school choice, in ISAIM 2012
(International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics (ISAIM 2012), Fort
Lauderdale, Florida, USA, January 9-11, 2012) Proceedings, 2012.
[20] Onur Kesten, School choice with consent, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125 (2010),
pp. 1297–1348.
[21] Harold W. Kuhn, The hungarian method for the assignment problem, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 2 (1955), pp. 83–97.
, Variants of the hungarian method for assignment problems, Naval Research Logistics
[22]
Quarterly, 3 (1956), pp. 253–258.
[23] Florin Manea and Calina Ploscaru, Solving a combinatorial problem with network flows,
Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computing, 17 (2005), pp. 391–399.
[24] Eric S Maskin, Mechanism design: How to implement social goals, American Economic Review, 98 (2008), pp. 567–576.

School Choice as a One-Sided Matching Problem

19

[25] Daniel Mcfadden, The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to leo hurwicz and jeanjacque laffont, Rev Econ Design, 13 (2009), pp. 77–100.
[26] James Munkres, Algorithms for the assignment and transportation problems, Journal of the
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 5 (1957), pp. 32–38.
[27] Chris Rorres and Howard Anton, Applications of Linear Algebra, John Wiley and Sons,
3rd edition ed., 1984.
[28] Alvin E Roth, The economics of matching: Stability and incentives, Mathematics of Operations Research, 7 (1982), pp. 617–628.
[29]
, Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions, International Journal of Game Theory, 36 (2008), pp. 537–569.
[30] Alvin E Roth and Marilda Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic
Modeling and Analysis, Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge University
Press, 1990.
[31] Cecilia Elena Rouse, Schools and student achievement: More evidence from the milwaukee
parental choice program, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, (1998), pp. 61–76.
[32] Alexander Schrijver, Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency. Vol. A, vol. 24
of Algorithms and Combinatorics, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2003. Paths, flows, matchings,
Chapters 1–38.

